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Pemilu Presiden, Legislatif, Pilkada
Spanners in the works
1998-06-01
The first week of the Habibie presidency was considerably smoother than could have
been expected, indeed that he is still President is more than many pundits had
expected. The first tentative steps towards de-Soehartoising Indonesia have also
begun. A reform oriented informal national consensus remains in place. Some
political prisoners have been released, while others have been permitted to speak to
the press for the first time in decades. The need for general elections based on a new
election law, including new party system, are agreed by all making their views public.
The sensitive issue of winding back commercial privilege accorded to the Soeharto
clan and close friends has already begun. Thus far the process has been
extraordinarily smooth.
This appearance of tranquillity does not mean the country's stress fractures have
healed. Far from it. What it means at this stage is that the recognition for substantive
reform of the political system is seen as either desirable (by idealists) or unstoppable
(by realists). While this is all well and good when the country is looking at broad
principles, there are numerous potential pitfalls where differences of opinion, or more
importantly interest, could degenerate into conflict. Matters over which conflict could
emerge include:
• the use of district voting (single member electorates) or proportional representation
(multimember/party electorates);
• What restriction, if any, will there be on political party participation. Will the
electoral system be open to such organisations as the People's Democratic Party
(PRD), Indonesian United Democratic Party (PUDI), or even the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI). What about ethnic-geographic organisations such as the
Free Papua Movement (OPM) or Independent Aceh (Aceh Merdeka) or some
Maubere (East Timor) independence organisation;
• Will or will there not be restrictions on participation by certain individuals in the
elections either as candidates or even participants such as ex-political
prisoners/guerilla leaders? Would renouncing violence be sufficient to gain
admission?
• Will or will not members of the Armed Forces be permitted a free vote, or will
their leadership continue to seek special consideration for representation in the
legislature as compensation for disenfranchisement at the polls?
• Will the Head of State/Government continue to be appointed by a national
congress, or will this be devolved to a popular vote?
• To what extent will the national electoral institute be independent of
government/executive influence?
• To what extent will other components of the state, especially the civil and military
wings of the bureaucracy, play a neutral role in the electoral process and election
campaign?
• What role, if any, will Pancasila play in determining who or what parties are
eligible for admission to the electoral races?
• What restrictions, if any, will apply to issues which may or may not be raised
during the campaign process?
• What restrictions, if any, will apply to campaign methods which may or may not be
used during the election?
{The footnotes in this document were added on 31 December 2006, as I reviewed the
original document – all with the comforting distance of almost 9 years of hind-sight!
The comments are intended to provide both a little historic context that may now have
been forgotten with time and also to provide some auto-criticism of where I believe
my analysis was flawed or perhaps biased. From the original document I have also
corrected typing mistakes and grammatical errors without changing the integrity and
substance of what was initially written. The footnotes therefore do not represent part
of the original document.}
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